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!is Issue Brief considers the role and nature of existing and potential international dispute 
resolution fora in relation to international environmental law. It addresses impediments at the 
international level, such as limited access to justice by non-state actors and the lack of techni-
cal and scienti"c capability. As a conceptual paper, it highlights two possible remedial options: 
an International Environmental Tribunal and an International Environmental Court.  
Context of International Environmental Dispute Resolution
Since the Stockholm Conference in 1972, regional and multilateral environmental agree-
ments (MEAs) covering a broad subject matter have proliferated.1 Common to many MEAs 
are endogenous mechanisms that facilitate advancement of treaty objectives. !ese include 
institutional structures such as Conference of the Parties supervisory bodies and monitor-
ing, reporting, and veri"cation obligations.2 Failure to implement treaty obligations domes-
tically, or non-compliance with related conventional or customary obligations, may trigger 
state responsibility by the malefactor and permit an injured state to bring a claim under 
international law.3 
Enforcement for treaty non-compliance may be pursued through various diplomatic and 
legal means, which are often expressly articulated in the text of a treaty, ranging from nego-
tiation through to arbitration and formal adjudication. Certain treaties may even provide 
for binding dispute resolution procedures.4 Although international courts and specialist 
tribunals increasingly address environmental matters, they have limitations: standing to 
bring a claim is generally restricted to states, jurisdictions may overlap and contribute to 
fragmentation, and pronouncements are often of modest signi"cance. 
Another approach to managing compliance and enforcement issues is through the use 
of treaty-based non-compliance procedures. Non-compliance procedures are a relatively 
modern creation that are designed, among other things, to allow states to fail to comply 
with an international treaty without having to publicly “break” or “violate” a speci"c obliga-
tion. States generally wish to be seen as complying with international law and “non-compli-
ance” is perceptually preferable to “breaking” or “violating” a treaty. !e di#erences may be 
more in nomenclature than legal import, but many in the international legal community 
argue that non-compliance procedures are better to induce conformity with treaty obli-
gations than orthodox “penalties.”5 Because high levels of treaty conformity, compliance 
and participation are required to e#ectively address regional and global environmental 
matters, non-compliance procedures have become important managerial tools and are 
found in treaties such as the Montreal Protocol to the Ozone Convention, the Aarhus 
Convention, and the Kyoto Protocol. While the legal community heralds non-compli-
ance procedures as innovative mechanisms that may allow public participation, they 
are not systemically integrated into the broader corpus of general international law 
where international environmental law is situated.6 
!is brief contributes to the ongoing “experimentation and exploration”7 of envi-
ronmental dispute settlement mechanism thinking. It conceptually examines why 
a new legal institution with open standing rules may be necessary and what it 
may look like. In particular, it attempts to sketch a conceptual blueprint outlin-
ing the need, purpose, operation and modes of creating an International Court 
for the Environment (ICE), both as an ad hoc arbitral body and a formal judicial 
institution. !is concept is not new and has mixed support.8 But, given the 
increasing global environmental consciousness, the time may well be ripe to 
push this conversation along. 
“[An] ICE Tribunal or 
Court could become 
the ultimate environmental 
dispute settlement body, 
whose jurisprudence could 
"lter down into national 
environmental courts.”
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Why a New International Dispute Resolution 
Institution? 
No dispute resolution body exists at the international level with 
exclusive jurisdiction or specialized subject matter expertise 
to hear and determine environmental matters. Although the 
ICJ established a Chamber of Environmental Matters in 1993, 
it was never used and closed in 2006.9 While other specialized 
judicial bodies such as the International Tribunal of the Law of 
the Sea, for example, play a role in environmental dispute reso-
lution, they are often limited in jurisdiction and subject matter 
competence.10 In addition, access to international courts and 
tribunals is limited to states while contributions to and conse-
quences from environmental harm spread to non-state actors. 
For instance, the e#ects of climate change now being felt are 
primarily the consequence of private or state-endorsed (energy- 
generating) activities. Mechanisms to determine liability for 
damage are underdeveloped, but progress has begun through 
a new loss and damage mechanism.11 An ICE could help infuse 
the rule of law into a system deeply plagued by politics.
Inadequate Environmental and Scientific  
Knowledge in International Courts and Tribunals
While the ICJ can appoint technical advisers to a case, includ-
ing scientists, it has failed to do so in seminal cases such as 
2006 Pulp Mills suit, which involved Argentina bringing a claim 
against Uruguay for breaching a long-standing bilateral agree-
ment by permitting the construction of two water-polluting 
pulp mills on the Uruguay River. 
!is de"cit was observed in the joint dissenting opinion of ICJ 
Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma (Simma being one of the 
most illustrious international judges), who noted a number 
of inadequacies in the judgment, including: (1) the manner in 
which the ICJ evaluated scienti"c evidence was $awed, (2) the 
Court should have appointed scienti"c experts, (3) overall the 
Court missed a “golden opportunity” to “demonstrate its ability 
to approach scienti"cally complex disputes in a state-of-the-
art manner.”12 Poignantly, they stated that the Court:
…had before it a case on international environmental law 
of an exemplary nature—a textbook example, so to speak, 
of alleged transfrontier pollution—yet, the Court has  
approached it in a way that will increase doubts in the  
international legal community whether it, as an institu-
tion, is well-placed to tackle complex scienti"c questions.
It is beyond doubt that the ICJ plays a pivotal role in interna-
tional jurisprudence, but it has limitations. Other specialized 
judicial bodies such as the International Tribunal of the Law 
of the Sea also play a role, which is limited in jurisdiction and 
subject matter competence to issues arising out of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.13 But there is no 
specialized international dispute resolution body with com-
petence and expertise over environmental law matters. An In-
ternational Court for the Environment could "ll this gap. Such 
an institution could be constituted as an informal Tribunal or 
a formalized Court and would be able to remedy many of the 
abovementioned issues.
Restricted Access to International Courts  
and Tribunals  
Under the historical classical conception of international law, 
only states had international legal personality, and therefore 
it was only states that had access to international courts and 
tribunals such as International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the 
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. !is conception is pred-
icated upon various notions such as state sovereignty and that 
international legal obligations were exclusively the province of 
states. Since the early 20th century this notion has been chal-
lenged, and it is now widely recognized that many non-state 
actors, including natural and legal persons, have rights under 
international law backed by international responsibility. 
Currently, the international environmental regime lacks 
judicial fora accessible by individuals and civil society, among 
others, to keep states and non-state actors accountable for 
environmental harm. !is inadequacy was highlighted in the 
1997 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case, a dispute over the construc-
tion of hydroelectric power stations on the Danube River. 
Judge Weeramantry, in his separate opinion, recognized the 
ICJ’s limitations and stated that international law needs to 
evolve beyond state-state dispute resolution to hear matters 
of “global concern of humanity as a whole.”14 While some prog-
ress has occurred in a regional context through the Aarhus 
Convention,15 that progress is limited by its geographic scope 
of application and membership.
Non-State Actor Contribution to  
Environmental Harm 
!ere is an increasing awareness that activities of non-state ac-
tors, such as generation of carbon emissions, toxic waste and oil 
pollution, have considerable trans-boundary and global conse-
quences. Accordingly, non-state actors responsible for interna-
tional environmental harm must be held to account. !e "rst 
mechanisms for doing so are domestic legal and administrative 
systems. However, many domestic courts have an uneasy rela-
tionship with international law, whether it manifests through 
national legislation or is directly applicable through custom or 
constitutional convention. Similarly, technical competence to 
adequately address and pronounce on environmental law dis-
putes varies between countries. To overcome these shortcom-
ings, a necessary second line of defense is access to judicial and 
arbitral support at the international level, especially for glob-
ally signi"cant environmental disputes. 
The Purpose of an ICE
Local environmental practices often have global consequences. 
It may not be possible to address the wide range of internation-
al environmental issues without mandatory international stan-
dards and enforcement measures. To this end, the goals of an 
ICE, among other things, would be to: (1) clarify and ascertain 
environmental legal obligations of disputing parties, (2) facili-
tate harmonization of and complement existing legislative and 
judicial systems, (3) provide access to justice to a broad range 
of actors through open standing rules, (4) provide workable so-
lutions to modern environmental concerns, and (5) build trust 
among the international community. 
!ese goals and the operation of an ICE will bene"t multiple 
stakeholders, including states, businesses and civil society. 
But while there are no legal obstacles to creating an ICE, the 
concept may face resistance in certain quarters, particularly in 
politics and business. Resistance is likely to be driven by fear of 
litigation, scrutiny and accountability—much-needed aspects 
of responsible international environmental governance. But an 
ICE could actually provide useful clarity for governments and 
businesses regarding international environmental issues. 
For example, the legal content of the principle of sustainable 
development is equivocal and has not been judicially deter-
mined, but as a concept it has in$uence over both international 
and domestic law and policy. An ICE could assist to determine 
the legal meaning of this concept and provide states and busi-
nesses with clarity of their obligations. Determinations could 
then contribute to enhancing ecologically responsible interna-
tional practices and standards and may assist in reducing the 
likelihood of human-caused environmental catastrophes. By 
addressing such signi"cant matters, over time an ICE would 
become the preeminent global center of excellence for environ-
mental law and jurisprudence. It would improve harmoniza-
tion across international environmental regimes and coherent-
ly cultivate the global environmental law system of governance, 
preventing situations like Pulp Mills. What could an ICE look 
like, and how could it function? !e following sections examine 
two possible manifestations: a Tribunal and a Court. !e Tri-
bunal would be a specialized, ad hoc dispute resolution body 
requiring consent of both parties, whereas the Court would be 
a formal international court system similar to the ICJ. 
An ICE Tribunal Conceptual Overview  
Structure and Operations
A new ICE Tribunal could provide an informal, ad hoc body with 
specialized environmental science and law subject matter ex-
pertise. While it could be modeled on the best practices of arbi-
tration institutions such as the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA) and the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), it would operate only in a restricted issue area. !is factor 
distinguishes ICE from existing arbitration bodies such as the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, and will ensure its credibility 
and reliability in resolving environmental disputes.
An ICE Tribunal could mirror many existing rules, procedures 
and enforcement authority, with necessary modi"cations as 
required. For instance, the LCIA and ICC have predetermined 
rules for resolving disputes submitted to them, derived from 
best practice over time or parties can determine rules of proce-
dure and evidence to apply.16 ICE, like the LICA and ICC, could 
have a standing panel of arbitrators, which consists of environ-
mental law experts, or pure environmental science experts, or 
panelists with any expertise required for the environmental 
matter. Parties could then choose their preferred arbitrator, 
with con"dence that any arbitrator would be equipped to deal 
with the subject matter.
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
Parties would need to agree if the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is ex-
clusive or non-exclusive (it is more common that other bodies 
can also hear the dispute). If exclusive jurisdiction is agreed 
upon, the parties would need to agree what subject matter 
the jurisdiction applies to; for example, that the dispute raises 
questions of or relating to international environmental law. If 
non-exclusive jurisdiction is agreed, subject matter jurisdiction 
is less of a question, especially if one party prefers to submit 
the matter to another body. Additionally, practice shows that 
when parties agree to non-exclusive jurisdiction, reference of 
the matter to the non-exclusive court or tribunal by one party 
will lead to the other party agreeing to have the matter dealt 
with by that court or tribunal. !is may also occur if one party 
unilaterally submits a matter to the ICE Tribunal. If the other 
party does not join, a decision will have no legal e#ect beyond 
normative in$uence and reputational damage, both of which 
have signi"cantly advanced environmental awareness and 
practices. 
Alternatively, the ICE Tribunal may itself predetermine its sub-
ject matter, temporal and geographic jurisdiction and basic 
minimum threshold for a matter to fall within its scope. Should 
this occur, parties could agree in advance to submit disputes 
covering the entire scope, or a smaller subcategory ( for exam-
ple, matters related to oil transportation but not drilling).
In addition to jurisdiction, the choice of law application to a 
dispute will also need to be determined (e.g., international, re-
gional, national law, or a combination). Parties may choose to 
determine the applicable law in any agreement between them, 
but it is likely that the ICE Tribunal would reserve the right for 
international law to prevail over any other con$icting law. A 
“default option” that provides certainty and consistency, as well 
as "lling any legal gaps, is for the ICE Tribunal rules to provide 
for the application of international environmental law as it 
stands at the time the matter is heard. 
Access and Remedies
Importantly, like the LCIA and ICC, an ICE Tribunal, in accor-
dance with the parties’ agreement, o#ers the $exibility of being 
constituted anywhere in the world, with appropriate facilities. 
3
“An ICE could help infuse the rule of law into a system deeply plagued by politics.”
4In determining the location, parties may wish to bear in mind 
that tribunal decisions are likely to be subject to overall (but 
limited depending on the relevant arbitration legislation)17 
supervision by superior courts in the jurisdiction where the 
arbitration seat is located. Providing that the arbitration seat is 
in a country that is a party to the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards 
1957 (which applies to almost all developed and most emerg-
ing economies), the default position would be that ICE Tribu-
nal decisions will be binding between the parties and enforce-
able as a judgment in any other country that is also party to the 
Convention.18
Parties may otherwise agree that decisions are not binding 
but subject only to a declaratory judgment. !is would enable 
action against future behavior inconsistent with the declara-
tion. If none of this were agreed, the only consequence of non-
compliance would be reputational. !is may be ampli"ed if the 
Tribunal panel is highly regarded and should not be underes-
timated. Some of the most in$uential tribunal decisions are 
underwritten by the reputation and facility of its arbitrators.19
Funding 
A number of options exist to fund an ICE Tribunal. First, all 
costs could be borne by the parties. An LCIA case presently 
costs £1,500 to commence, plus the arbitrators’ fees on an 
hourly basis, usually around £300–£500 per hour. Second, state 
parties to an agreement that establishes the ICE Tribunal could 
fund the institution through fees based on a predetermined 
formula, such as the UN contribution model. !ird, corpora-
tions may provide long-term grants, in return for access by its 
corporate entities as needed. !is may also create positive 
public perception bene"ts for those entities, by demonstrating 
a commitment to good environmental practice. Should the ICE 
Tribunal not have permanent infrastructure, but operate as an 
ad hoc body, establishment and operational expenses would be 
minimal.
Establishing and Using the ICE Tribunal 
!e quickest, cheapest and easiest way to establish an ICE Tri-
bunal is by mutual agreement between parties (be they states, 
corporations, NGOs, international organizations or individu-
als). !is may occur either before or after a dispute arises. If 
parties to an agreement "nd that an actual dispute has arisen, 
but the agreement either does not provide for dispute settle-
ment procedures or permits party discretion, they may agree to 
refer the matter to the ICE Tribunal. Such ad hoc referral might 
be helpful for parties who had not expected to have a relation-
ship with each other (e.g., a community which su#ers by reason 
of an unexpected polluting incident).
Alternatively, parties could agree in advance that certain 
issues that arise between them will be mandatorily referred 
to the ICE Tribunal. !is can be achieved by inserting an ICE 
Tribunal clause into any agreement (a standard form would be 
created).20 Similarly, MEAs or intergovernmental organizations 
could use the ICE Tribunal as a joint alternative to, or replace-
ment of, their own tribunals or non-compliance procedures, 
or apply their rules to its proceedings (thus introducing some 
coherence into global environmental arbitration). 
An ICE Court Conceptual Overview
Structure and Operations
In theory, if the ICE Tribunal worked well enough, an ICE 
Court may never be required, since every possible entity (every 
state, corporation, NGO, etc.) would sign up and be subject to 
its authority. But this is an unlikely scenario. Accordingly, an 
independent judicial institution may be required as the pri-
mary forum for resolving environmental disputes arising from 
customary and treaty-based obligations. 
Once established, the operations and daily functioning of the 
court will be determined in the "rst instance by its constitu-
tion, which sets out, among other things, matters relating to 
jurisdiction, the types of evidence that can be relied upon, 
procedure, subject matter scope and standing provisions. As a 
permanent international court, these rules will be established 
at the outset; however, they may be revised over time, and 
would not provide the $exibility of an ICE Tribunal.
In practice, however, an ICE Tribunal would provide the con-
ceptual template for how a Court could work in terms of de-
cision-making, procedure and, above all, the application of 
a corpus of well-reasoned international environmental law. 
!erefore, in some sense, few di#erences exist between the ICE 
Tribunal and Court.
Jurisdiction
!e most signi"cant di#erences between the Tribunal and 
Court are the means by which parties would agree to use the 
ICE Court and how it would exercise its jurisdiction. In the Tri-
bunal model, parties agree to use it. In the Court model, states 
would agree that the Court will have jurisdiction in their terri-
tories, covering a state’s own acts and the acts of corporations, 
NGOs, individuals and other domiciled entities. Accordingly, 
the jurisdiction of the Court would be permanent — represent-
ing a symbol of environmental stewardship — and adjudica-
tion could be compulsory for certain matters. 
!is represents a shift from consent-based jurisdiction, where 
parties agree to a matter being heard by an international Court. 
!is approach is necessary because many domestic causes of 
environmental harm have international consequences, such as 
emitting unsustainable levels of carbon dioxide into the atmo-
sphere. Real progress in addressing international environmen-
tal harm and degradation will be sti$ed without mandatory 
adjudication measures. 
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Of course, in light of the above goals, it is possible that an ICE 
Court would have jurisdiction, rules and procedures that vary 
from the ICE Tribunal. For instance, to ensure that it is not 
overrun by casework, the Court’s jurisdiction may be restricted 
to only the “most serious” breaches of international environ-
mental law such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, in line with a 
similar restriction at the International Criminal Court.21
Standard-Setting Legal Body
Over time, an ICE Court may determine environmental matters 
relating to customary international law and subsume the role 
of existing environmental treaty–based enforcement bodies. 
!is could include those established, for example, under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversi-
ty. To the extent that such incorporation is not possible, there 
could be a “carve out” of the ICE Court’s jurisdiction to prevent 
overlap with existing bodies. Alternatively, the Court could pro-
vide a judicial review–like function of legal decisions made by 
these bodies and those of subsequent treaty supervisory bodies 
(should ICE not become the designated body). For instance, the 
Court may need to determine whether a decision of the Confer-
ence of the Parties to a treaty has legal e#ect for States to that 
treaty. !is may also be facilitated through ICE Court advisory 
opinions.
Access and Remedies
Importantly, the Court will have broad standing rules that pro-
vide direct access to all parties, will have transparency in its 
proceedings and decision-making and will receive technical 
and scienti"c information. !is may necessitate the develop-
ment of innovative remedies to address the environmental 
issues in question. For example, the Court may issue declara-
tory relief, "nes and sanctions of restoration and rehabilitation 
of damaged habitats akin to those in the European Community 
Environmental Liability Directive.22 !e ICE Court could also 
be empowered to hand down declarations of incompatibility 
of Signatory State legislation when it con$icts with MEA rules. 
!ere would also be provision for interim measures, speci"-
cally, injunctions to preserve environmental evidence and state 
of a#airs as found in most domestic and international courts. 
In addition, while it could sanction Signatory States for failure 
to enforce judgments (e.g., naming and shaming wrongdoers), 
Court judgments would lack mandatory enforcement powers, 
as does the ICJ.23 Yet ICJ judgments are highly regarded and pro-
vide considerable political and public pressure for compliance. 
So too could an ICE Court. 
Finally, the judgments of an ICE Court would be well reasoned 
and demonstrate a deep appreciation of the interrelationship 
between law, science, the environment and other technical 
matters. Accordingly, only judges that have a broader knowl-
edge of environmental law than those of extant courts will 
be appointed. Additionally, specialist technical panels could 
assist judicial decision-making and would be mandated in 
most, if not all, cases.
Establishing and Using the ICE Court 
Bringing an ICE Tribunal into existence is conceptually more 
straightforward than bringing to life an ICE Court. !e pri-
mary reason is that a permanent ICE Court would have to 
be established through an international treaty, which is then 
transposed into national law. !is process could start by a rec-
ommendation at an international conference, supported by a 
UN General Assembly resolution authorizing the commence-
ment of negotiations. Accordingly, funding would most likely 
be based on the UN contribution model. 
While a draft constitution has already been prepared for the 
Court,24 it is likely that negotiations would ensue informally for 
some time and culminate in an international conference where 
State delegates formally agree to the constitution text. After 
agreement of the text, a predetermined number of States will 
need to sign and ratify the treaty before the ICE Court o%cially 
comes into being. 
Recently, the most appropriate forum for such a process was 
the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Develop-
ment, which did not address this point.25 It seems that for the 
moment, there is limited political space at the international 
level to commence the preparatory work for an ICE Court. !is 
is not to say that conversations are not occurring,26 but the 
massive drive that catalyzed the formation of the International 
Criminal Court is presently lacking in the environment space. 
Many reasons exist for this, including disenchantment with 
global governance.
Conclusion 
At a general level, an ICE Tribunal or Court could become the 
primary forum for environmental disputes that are currently 
being referred to disparate ad hoc tribunals and courts. !e 
ICE Tribunal is envisaged as an informal institution that can be 
set up quickly and cheaply in the interim and which can serve 
as a working advertisement for the bene"ts that a formal ICE 
Court could bring in the future. !ese fora will be able to receive 
scienti"c and technical evidence and be constituted by panel-
lists and judges pro"cient in matters of international law and 
natural sciences. Additionally, they could, in theory, reduce the 
need for ad hoc MEA dispute settlement bodies, thus avoiding 
unnecessary costs. Moreover, an ICE Tribunal or Court could 
become the ultimate environmental dispute settlement body, 
whose jurisprudence could "lter down into national environ-
mental courts.27 Given the low probability that all states would 
initially sign up to an ICE Court (akin to the formation of the 
International Criminal Court), it is likely that there would still 
be a role for an ICE Tribunal.
“[W]hile there are no legal obstacles to creating an ICE, the concept may face resistance 
in certain quarters, particularly in politics and business. But an ICE could actually 
provide useful clarity for government and business.”
6Box 1. Example of ICE Arbitration Clause
Table 1. Comparison of relative benefits between ICE Tribunal and Court models 
“The parties agree that any issue between them arising out of or relating to this agreement shall/may 
[depending on exclusive/non-exclusive jurisdiction] be resolved by one/three arbitrators pursuant to the 
ICE tribunal rules/by the ICE tribunal sitting in [location].”
And
“A party can commence such a reference by making a request for arbitration to the ICE tribunal. The 
parties agree that the issue between them shall be addressed and/or determined by the ICE tribunal in 
accordance with the ICE tribunal rules.”
Or
“A party can commence such a reference by appointing its arbitrator and giving notice to the other party of 
this, upon the receipt of which notice the other party shall have 28 days to appoint its arbitrator. The com-
mencing party shall inform ICE of its appointment and upon appointment of the second arbitrator, those 
two shall appoint a chairman from a list supplied by ICE. The ICE tribunal so constituted shall address 
and/or determine the issue referred to it in accordance with the ICE tribunal rules.”
Tribunal and Court Similarities
Tribunal and Court Differences
Fair trial: Independence and impartiality.
Credibility: Authority, expertise and ability to receive scienti!c and technical evidence. Reliable quality of dispute resolution,  
contrasted with some existing options.
Integration: Ability to address issues arising across multiple environmental law regimes — national, regional, trade-body related, etc.
Unilateral action: Where a party unilaterally wants a declaration on a point, which will be respected and noted internationally.  
There are no real options for that party at present.
Access to justice: Anyone could bring a matter before the ICE Tribunal or Court.
Choice: Tribunal may be used if there is no obvious dispute settlement forum for the matter in question or if there are too many competing 
jurisdictions. Court would seek to minimize “forum shopping” by its status as the “primary” environmental dispute settlement body.
Expense: A tribunal is inexpensive. A Court, especially if it has a permanent physical location, will have capital and ongoing  
operational expenses.
Speed: The ICE Tribunal, because of its simplicity and "exibility would be able to deal with matters quickly. In particular, the Tribunal  
“expands” by way of appointment of arbitrators, to deal with an expanded caseload. There could therefore never be a backlog of cases.  
A Court would inherently be slower, especially if it had a large workload.
Permanence: As a full-time permanent body, the Court may have a strong symbolic presence in addition to its regular development of 
environmental jurisprudence. 
Confidentiality: Arbitration is usually con!dential, as could be the ICE Tribunal hearings. However, if con!dentiality were to be adopted, it 
would negate part of the aim of the ICE concept, which is to develop international environmental law and to publicize case reports, articles 
and other materials. Con!dentiality should therefore only be permitted in exceptional circumstances, by agreement between the parties.  
An ICE Court will be an open and transparent public body, with judgments/decisions published and freely available.
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